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 Women in Society: The Critical Potential 
of Stein’s Feminism for Our Understanding 
of the State 
 Mette  Lebech 
 Abstract  In this paper I intend to place Stein’s philosophy of woman in the context 
of, on one hand, her (earlier) work on society and the state and, on the other hand, 
her (later) work on philosophical and theological anthropology. I want to do this in 
order to assess Stein’s understanding of the role of women in society (as a special 
case of the relationship of human beings with society) and in order to evaluate the 
critical potential of Stein’s thought for the organization of the state. First, I briefl y 
discuss the nature and context of Stein’s works on women, society and the human 
being. Second, I then focus on three key terms: vocation, power and state in order to 
bring out their relationship to one other. Finally, I address the question of whether 
Stein’s thought on woman and the state can be summed up by the idea that a signifi -
cant part of the vocation of the human being is to manage power in and of the state. 
 Stein’s Works on Woman, the Human Being, Society 
and the State 
 Edith Stein lectured in the late 1920s and early 1930s on women throughout 
Germany, mainly to women engaged in the teaching professions and often to 
Catholics. Those lectures made her well known in her time, and have often since 
overshadowed her more philosophical work, probably because they are about a 
topic of interest to many who would otherwise fi nd philosophical considerations too 
laborious and time consuming. 
 Stein’s lectures on women (a 11 of which are printed in Volume 13 of Herder’s 
critical edition of Steins collected works) 1 form part of the middle period of her 
work, which date from her baptism into the Catholic Church on New Years Day 
1  Stein [ 1 ]. 
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1922 to her entrance into Carmel on 15 October 1933. The bulk of the lectures are 
contemporaneous with her lectures given at the Marianum (1932–1933), a teacher 
training college in Münster. These later lectures are now published as  Der Aufbau 
der menschlichen Person and  Was ist der Mensch ? ( Structure of the Human Person 
and  What is the Human Being ? 2 ). These two works consisting of a philosophical and 
a theological anthropology were intended as a contribution to the foundation of a 
Roman Catholic educational theory. They form the immediate background to the 
lectures on women and women’s education and serve as their philosophical and 
theological anchor. In these volumes we fi nd Stein’s later philosophy of the human 
being most fully explored. 
 To understand Stein’s view of society, however, we must turn to her early phe-
nomenological work, undertaken while she was still editing Husserl’s  Ideas II and 
 III (1919–1920). Her  Beiträge zur philosophischen Begründung der Psychologie 
und der Geisteswissenschaften (translated as  Philosophy of Psychology and the 
Humanities ) and  Eine Untersuchung über den Staat ( An Investigation Concerning 
the State ), although published respectively in 1922 and 1925, were written earlier 
and both grew from concerns with Husserl’s attempt to ground the sciences, in par-
ticular, the human and social sciences. Together they provide a comprehensive and 
subtle social philosophy. 
 Key Terms 
 Stein referred to these early treatises on several occasions in her later work in order 
to clarify her position on various issues. We have, therefore, no reason to think that 
she would have repudiated any of their insights, and thus we can read and explain 
the later works and their key terms in the light of the earlier works. 
 Vocation 
 Sophie Bingeli mentions that Stein’s understanding of vocation ( Beruf ), understood 
as “a means to actualize human strengths and to fulfi l the personality, sheds a new 
light on the relationship between occupation ( Beruf ) and the family.” 3 The transla-
tion of this quotation illustrates how the German term  Beruf / Berufung , here trans-
lated as vocation as well as occupation, has a wider application than the English 
term, although some of this wider application is picked up in expressions such as 
vocational training. Both vocation and  Beruf expresses the idea of a calling, i.e., 
something one is called to do (by others or by God), as well as the idea of a profes-
sion or occupation by which one earns one’s living. 
2  These works are not yet translated into English. Translations of cited texts are my own. 
3  See the Introduction to  Die Frau , xxi. 
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 Vocation ( Beruf / Berufung ) is used by Stein in conjunction with terms like task 
( Aufgabe ), education ( Bildung ), specifi city ( Bestimmung ,  Eigenart ) and unfolding 
( Entfaltung ). 4 It applies to individuals as well as to communities. It has a different 
meaning than destiny insofar as vocation implies a teleology; it is not a (mere) hap-
pening (planned) from the outside (by fate) that may or may not correspond to our 
deepest desires. Vocation has its roots and explanation in who we are. It stands in 
connection with education insofar as it is the task of education to bring out the 
specifi city of a being or a community. Education is thus at the service of the unfold-
ing of the personal individual and of the cultural community. 
 In the  Structure of the Human Person Stein makes it clear that knowledge of the 
beginning and end of the human being lies beyond what a philosophical investiga-
tion, and hence what a philosophical anthropology, can yield. Philosophical anthro-
pology relies on experience, on our experience, as human beings, and of what we 
can learn from it about who and what we are. We have, however, no direct experi-
ence of our beginning and of our end: to experience the beginning of experience and 
experience its end is impossible. We make up for this inherent limitation of fi nite 
experience by extrapolating from our experience of others’ beginning and end, by 
forming theories about them and holding these in faith. Insofar as the theoretical 
account of the beginning and end of human experience faces the question ‘why?’ in 
order to complete the understanding of the human being, it must be supported by a 
theological anthropology. Stein’s theological anthropology,  What is the Human 
Being ?, attempts to illuminate the question by discussing dogmatic declarations 
about the nature of the human being made over two millennia. 
 When Stein speaks of vocation, she presupposes not only the compatibility of 
philosophical and theological approaches, but also the necessity of completing the 
philosophical approach by a theological one. 5 She did not think, however, that the 
lived experience of values was directly altered by faith (although such experiences 
may be ordered by faith in a specifi c way). Thus a non-believer (as much as a 
believer) normally experiences the harmonious development of his or her own pre-
dispositions (talents) as valuable and may experience the sacrifi ce of other values as 
necessary. Most non-believers have a sense of vocation in the sense that they believe 
certain occupations to be more desirable than others, not only in general but also for 
them in particular. 
 For a woman (and it is women who are the focus of Stein’s specifi c refl ections on 
vocation), the unfolding called for by the vocation involves three dimensions: the 
unfolding of humanity, the unfolding of womanhood, and the unfolding of individu-
ality. 6 For a man, likewise, the unfolding comports three dimensions, that of human-
ity, that of manhood and that of individuality. For Stein, men and women are 
concrete individuals with concrete dimensions that resist arbitrary social control 
and any attempt at social engineering. Human beings are, in other words, real, not 
4  See  Die Frau and Edith Stein,  Bildung und Entfaltung der Individualität , in  Edith Stein 
Gesamtausgabe , vol. 16 (Freiburg: Herder, 2001). 
5  Die Frau , 172. This approach is explained in FEB 12–30. 
6  Die Frau , 171. 
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mere social constructions of a state in need of labourers, subjects and reproducers. 
Education must work with the given, and must take its cue from what is given: the 
vocation discovered and fostered in the process of education takes its concrete shape 
as a social reality in an occupation that, in turn, needs to respect the concreteness 
and multidimensionality of the individual. Since the vocation of the individual and 
the vocation of the community of individuals ultimately support one other (our 
social roles are at the service of others and of the common good, incorporating us 
into the whole Christ) (FEB 510–528), no ultimate confl ict can exist between voca-
tions. Nor are social roles rigidly tied to gender or to any other natural feature, as no 
one is only a woman or a man: everyone is also a human being like all other human 
beings as well as an individual with his or her specifi c traits and powers. All of these 
dimensions have meaning for the completion of humanity as a whole. 
 Power 
 The term “power” has a twofold meaning, which can be seen in its etymology in the 
Latin word  potentia . Power refers generally to the ability to do things, whether this 
ability is conceived as habitual (powers as faculties or capacities) or exercised 
(power as displayed) or whether this ability is possessed by individuals or by groups. 
 Stein, like many before her, compares the economy of forces or powers of the 
individual with that of the community in order to bring out their respective specifi ci-
ties. For Stein, power or force ( Kraft ,  Lebenskraft ) is a phenomenon we observe in 
our acts; it allows us to identify the psyche as the economy of energy of the indi-
vidual person (we shall come back to power in the sense of  Macht , understood here 
as political power, later, as we shall see that it relies on this fi rst sense of power as 
force). The human being, like other animals, gets tired. It experiences depletion and 
replenishment from both physical and spiritual sources. Mental and physical activ-
ity seems to use energy from our reservoir, whereas rest and the taking of nourish-
ment seem to build this reservoir up again (PPH I, I, § 4). Negative experiences 
drain us under the infl uence of negative values while positive experiences revitalize 
us through the infl uence of positive values. “The feelings don’t just feed on the life 
sphere by being experienced, as all other experiences do; they also affect the life 
sphere by their contents, which as such either supply power or consume it” (PPH 
217). There are also the deceptive energies that, like waves at the beach, invade and 
then withdraw, sucking away all and even more than they brought. We learn over a 
lifetime to manage our powers, in particular in relation to food, rest, activity, drugs, 
sex, money and recognition, which all can create dependencies when we abuse our 
ability to re-establish an equilibrium through habituation. 
 Communities also possess a life power. Here also
 every stirring of life costs an expenditure of power, and every time there is any great exer-
tion, it is followed by a slackening, a subsiding of power….Without a doubt, we have here 
the same “mechanism” as with the individual psyche: one power reservoir that has a range 
of functionings to maintain, and can’t be tapped too heavily by any [of them] lest the others 
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be put off line; a power reservoir that blows off its surpluses in an impulsive doing, just as 
it automatically replenishes itself when it threatens to fail. (PPH 202) 
 Stein adds,
 The life power of a community doesn’t exist independently and alongside of its compo-
nents, but rather coalesces from the power of the single [members]. However the individu-
als don’t contribute their full, undivided power into the community, but [contribute] only in 
so far as they are living as members of the community. Each one retains “reserves” for his 
or her own individual living. (PPH 203) 
 Furthermore,
 So inside of any community—and measured provisionally only by the infl uxes that the 
power of the whole gets from them—there are very different kinds of components: some 
that give mighty impulses to the community, others that enrich it only a little, and fi nally 
participants who draw off more than they contribute to it. (PPH 204) 
 Beyond contagion, power transfer is possible within the community when there 
is openness. The power shared with others “can help the individual along not only 
during a temporary failure of her power, but may even make her capable of achieve-
ments that she wouldn’t be able to pull off on her own even with her life power at 
optimal status” (PPH 205). Stein continues,
 Thus, the level of life power of a community depends upon these two factors: the life power 
that its components can draw upon, and the amount of the power at their disposal that they 
devote to the community. Therefore the power of a community can be increased in two 
ways: by receiving new powerful individuals, and by demanding more from those who 
already belong to it. Accordingly, it can be weakened in two ways: if its components drift 
off, and if the individuals belonging to it slacken in their accomplishments for the commu-
nity. (PPH 205–206) 
 As openness is the precondition of the sharing of life power, the attitudes we take 
to each other contribute to or diminish the life power of the community.
 The contents [of the attitudes]—deploy a specifi c effi cacy within the human beings whom 
they befall. The love which I meet with strengthens and invigorates me and grants me the 
power for unexpected achievements. The distrust I run into disables my creative power. 
Other peoples’ attitudes encroach directly upon my inner life and control its course—unless 
I “lock myself up” against them, which is possible here as with all causal infl uences. (PPH 
212) 
 Stein also notes that
 …the solidarity of individuals, which becomes visible in the infl uence of the attitudes of 
one upon the life of the others, is formative of community in the highest degree….Where…
the attitudes of one don’t bounce off of the other but rather penetrate him and deploy their 
effi cacy, there a communal life subsists, there the two are members of one whole; and with-
out such a reciprocal relationship community isn’t possible. If we imagine a behaviour in 
which one individual takes the other purely as an object whose “ways of reacting” he must 
take precautions against, then the unity of life that makes up community is sliced apart…. 
Neither infection by someone else’s life states, nor infl uence by someone else’s attitudes, 
nor shared motivation, is possible [then]…. The attitudes that the components of the com-
munity implement with respect to it therefore are of the utmost importance as factors upon 
which its power and its life depend. (PPH 214–215) 
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 Life power is thus not only experienced in the individual, but it is also experi-
enced as a characteristic of communities, as their vitality. “Inasmuch as values 
“induce” attitudes in us whose contents convey new propellant powers to our mental 
life, we have regarded them themselves as “life-contributing”” (PPH 213). Stein 
observes, “…the experienced values are not only motives that prescribe the direc-
tion of my deed, but at the same time they furnish the propellant powers that it 
requires” (PPH 216). Life power thus takes two forms: it motivates or  is motivation 
(as spiritual) and it is felt (as psychic) as having a causal infl uence on us; furnishing 
us with “propellant powers” for action. By its free circulation, life power is life 
enhancing and community creating. It is the natural energy resource of human 
beings and thus the raw material of political power, what political power or  Macht 
attempts to steer and master. 
 State 
 Let us turn to our third key word. A state means the way things are, as in the expres-
sions the state of affairs or the state of the housing market. I interpret Stein as under-
standing the political state as the way things are in relation to the legislating 
subjectivity of a community constituting itself as sovereign. Power, in the sense of 
 Macht , manifests itself in relation to such sovereignty, either by being sovereign or 
relating to sovereignty. Power relies on people thinking that it is incontrovertible 
(i.e., capable of forcing) or legitimate (i.e., benefi cial to the functioning of the com-
munity) such that people accept the claims and obligations of power either for some 
reason (e.g., to be left in peace) or because of the perceived intrinsic value for the 
community of these claims and obligations. Thus power channels or directs pow-
ers—psychic and communal—in the sense of  Kraft . Political power must integrate 
all powers or succumb to other powers. 
 Various communities can be included in the state, and states can split particular 
communities: the nation state is the type of state that integrates a nation (and may or 
may not include minorities from other ethnic backgrounds). A state may be ruled in 
different ways, and particular models of the state have specifi c impact on the func-
tioning of the state, much like people’s behavior have on the community. A state 
may also be ruled by groups of people that are different from those elected or nomi-
nated to legislate. In this way, the real power to legislate may be in the hands, say, 
of multinational corporations, international organizations or fi nancial systems. 
 Stein’s understanding of the state relies on a distinction between different kinds 
of social relationships: common experiential structuration, mass ( Masse ), society 
( Gesellschaft ) and community ( Gemeinschaft ), which Stein elaborates from ele-
ments found in contemporary sociological theory, particularly in the work of 
Tönnies. These forms of sociality correspond to different aspects of the nature of 
human beings: through common experiential structuration (e.g., shared psychic 
structure and logic) the possibility for sharing impressions gives rise to experience 
of different types (e.g., science, art)), which corresponds to the human being having 
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a specifi c physical and spiritual form (PPH 239). In the mass of people life power is 
shared through sentient contagion: fear breeds fear, laughter makes people laugh. It 
relies on human beings having a sentient or psychic dimension that can receive and 
transmit energy directly from network to network without necessarily involving 
awareness, decision or personal responsibility (PPH 241). “Associations [societies] 
are social federations that are founded voluntarily. Free persons enter into them by 
virtue of an act of willing, and they may withdraw from them again in the same 
manner” (S 107). They rely on the human being having free will and the ability to 
choose even against her or his own inmost motivations (PPH 255). Life power is 
shared in society in a deliberate, i.e., not naïve, way, for certain reasons and with a 
purpose. Community, fi nally, involves openness and sharing of life power through 
solidarity. It is possible because the human being is a person and is capable of being 
spontaneously motivated in particular by the value of other people (S 2–6, PPH 
261ff.). 
 Stein does consider the state to rest essentially on a community, since “the state 
is not called into existence through an act of willing by individuals—as an associa-
tion is” (S 107). 7 But its emergence is very much prepared by associational struc-
tures, by social organization affi rming power, thus creating the ‘state’ of power, 
where sovereignty is affi rmed through those structures and that organization (S 
108). But insofar as the state consists in sovereignty affi rmed through acts of law-
making, the state cannot lose sovereignty and still remain a state: when a state is 
conquered and annexed to another, for example, the cultural community constitutive 
of the previous state may be integrated into the new one, not  as state but as a histori-
cal community. This, of course, is not the case if one state is indebted to another. 
The existence of the state is required for the debt to actually exist. 
 Power lies in the state and in its political functions 8 : political functions operate in 
relation to the sovereignty of the state (they are exercised in the name of the state) 
and receive their meaning from it. Since the essence of the state is sovereignty, it 
only indirectly, i.e., through its members, has a relationship with values. The state, 
then, is not essentially linked to the common good (or any good or evil for that mat-
ter). If the sovereignty of the state is threatened, it means that all its political func-
tions might fall back onto a self-organizing community. One might say that the 
closer one is to threatening and/or maintaining the sovereignty of the state, the more 
“power” one wields, understood in the sense of holding the key to the power and 
political functioning of state community members. 
 The whole community can be held captive by power (because the state employs 
power to organize itself), but it must be stressed that community may exist without 
the state and without sovereignty, i.e., without the power to command and execute 
the functions of the state. Community, in fact, does not rely on function (although it 
may be facilitated by it); community rather enables associational functionality. The 
community lives by naïve sharing of life power and is thus essentially distributing 
7  This claim, Stein says, is true, despite the analogy contractarians create that purports to refl ect the 
natural state of things. 
8 All the “political functions are inseparably bound to the state” (S 124). 
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power rather than concentrating it in the hands of a few for the sake of political 
functionality. In the same way as the state relies on community for the sovereignty 
it wields, naïve sharing of life power is a prerequisite for association. All associa-
tional forms of sociality fall apart if a basic sharing of purpose, language and mean-
ing is impossible: for Stein, a state community is necessary for the meaningfulness 
of political functions. 
 Is a Signifi cant Part of the Vocation of the Human Being 
to Manage Power in and of the State? 
 Insofar as the vocation of the individual human being, according to Stein, is fi nal-
ized by the fl owering of humanity as a whole, individual vocations fi nd their pur-
posefulness in service to humanity as a whole. Insofar as the state (whose goal is not 
the service of humanity, but the maintenance of sovereignty) is an intermediate 
social reality that exists in the world where vocations are lived out, the human being 
may, as part of his or her vocation to serve the common good, engage in political 
activity and thus contribute to manage political power and manage the power of the 
state. The human being does not have to do this however for the sake of its own 
unfolding, except if its specifi c vocation is to be involved in politics. The state is not, 
according to Stein, necessary for human unfolding. A state and the management of 
its power  may serve this unfolding, but it may also hinder it, as is the case in for 
example totalitarian regimes. 
 However, a signifi cant part of the vocation of every human being is to manage his 
or her own power ( Kraft ), understand and channel it in relation to the community 
and in the community. It may happen that this cannot be done in practice without 
taking up a political role and participate in society as a network of associational 
organization. This depends on the organization of the state in which one lives. 
 We are now ready to address the issues we set out to discuss: the role of women 
in society and the critical potential of Stein’s understanding of vocation in relation 
to the concrete organization of the state. 
 Arguably women have been, traditionally, more engaged in community life than 
men: their roles as caregivers for children, husbands, the elderly, and the ill, in 
domestic settings, have exposed them to the sufferings and joys of human beings as 
they are. Men, in their roles as providers and defenders of the domestic community, 
have traditionally been engaged in associational organization, where functions and 
agreements structured legal arrangements and military operations. For the unfold-
ing of the human being, however, the fi rst of these social relationships is essential, 
the other useful, and if lived without its foundation in community, positively 
 alienating. Association, in so far as its aim is the functioning of the community it 
serves, takes its ideal structure from the unfolding of the human being in community 
and should therefore be a medium through which this unfolding is protected, pro-
moted and realized. 
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 One could argue that a deformation of the sphere of society obtains when its 
basis in community is disregarded and it detaches itself in the pursuit of power for 
its own sake. Men and women can be caught in the two sides of this divide: they can 
be caught unrecognized, providing the communal basis for a society turned to the 
pursuit of power. And they can be caught in the pursuit of power, not recognizing 
their own personal dimension unfolding only in community. The latter misrecogni-
tion is the one that is the most detrimental to the human person and the more deform-
ing of the human vocation to personhood and community, according to Stein. It is 
not the fact that the vocation of women belongs ‘more’ to community than that of 
men. It is the  person who fi nds his or her fulfi llment in community, whether man or 
woman. Nor is it the case that the vocation of men is ‘more’ to associational life. 
Associational life fi nds its purpose in the protection and promotion of the unfolding 
of the human person, whether man or woman. Women may have, as Stein remarks, 
a tendency to overemphasize the personal. She advises them for this reason to 
engage more in ‘thoroughly objective work’. 9 Correspondingly, men may have a 
tendency to identify with power. One might think that such tendency could best be 
counteracted by paying attention to vulnerability and to naïve communication as 
community creating. 
 That the state, its political functions and the power occasioned by these func-
tions, is fi nalized by the unfolding of human persons in community is the critical 
edge of Stein’s understanding of vocation. It was voiced at a time, where power had 
detached itself from its end in organizing and thereby sustaining community. Stein’s 
philosophy of woman was designed to vindicate the concrete individuality of human 
persons, whether women or men, unfolding in a community supported by the state. 
Such a state is possible, she thought, only because and insofar as its representatives 
respect the values of the individual human being and of community. In this form of 
state, power never detaches itself from service: sovereignty has a purpose. 
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